

QCrypt 2018: On the possibility of classical client blind quantum computing

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Robin Hood



Main Goal




Figure: (Blind) Quantum Computing

Main Goal




Figure: (Blind) Quantum Computing

Main Goal




Figure: (Blind) Quantum Computing

Main Goal




Figure: (Blind) Quantum Computing

Main Goal




Figure: (Blind) Quantum Computing

Our solution


Universal Blind Quantum Computing (UBQC)
[A. Broadbent, J. Fitzsimons, E. Kashefi]

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


QFactory


UBQC in a nutshell




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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

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


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


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

UBQC in a nutshell






UBQC in a nutshell






UBQC in a nutshell





UBQC in a nutshell





UBQC in a nutshell






UBQC in a nutshell





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

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

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

UBQC in a nutshell



UBQC in a nutshell



UBQC in a nutshell



QFactory: description




Figure: QFactory gadget: simulate quantum channel

QFactory: description




Figure: QFactory gadget: simulate quantum channel

QFactory: description






Figure: QFactory: ideal functionality

Cryptographic assumptions



Cryptographic assumptions



Construction



Construction



t_k, k



Construction



t_k, k

$$(\alpha_i \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4} \dots \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$



Construction



t_k, k



$$(\alpha_i \leftarrow \{0, \frac{\pi}{4} \dots \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

$k, (\alpha_i)$



Construction




t_k, k

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4} \dots \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

$k, (\alpha_i)$

Compute circuit



Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n} |0\rangle^{\otimes m}$$




t_k, k

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

$k, (\alpha_i)$



Compute circuit



Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n} |0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle |0\rangle^{\otimes m}$$




t_k, k

$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4} \dots \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

$k, (\alpha_i)$



Compute circuit



Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n}|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|f_k(x)\rangle$$




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$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4} \dots \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

$k, (\alpha_i)$



Compute circuit



Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n}|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle$$




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Compute circuit



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
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$k, (\alpha_i)$



Compute circuit



Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n}|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\otimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$




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$k, (\alpha_i)$



Compute circuit



Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n}|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\otimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$




t_k, k



$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4} \dots \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

$k, (\alpha_i)$

Compute circuit



\Rightarrow Produces $|+\theta\rangle$

Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n}|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\otimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$



t_k, k




$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4} \dots \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

$k, (\alpha_i)$

Compute circuit

$y, (b_i)$



\Rightarrow Produces $|+\theta\rangle$

Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n}|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\otimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$



t_k, k




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$k, (\alpha_i)$

Compute circuit

$y, (b_i)$

$$(x, x') := \text{Inv}(t_k, y)$$



\Rightarrow Produces $|+\theta\rangle$

Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n}|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\otimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$



t_k, k



$$(\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, \frac{\pi}{4} \dots \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$


$k, (\alpha_i)$

Compute circuit

$y, (b_i)$

$$(x, x') := \text{Inv}(t_k, y)$$

$$\theta := (-1)^{x_n} \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} (x_i - x'_i)(b_i\pi + \alpha_i)$$



\Rightarrow Produces $|+\theta\rangle$

Construction

$$|0\rangle^{\otimes n}|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|0\rangle^{\otimes m} \Rightarrow \sum_x |x\rangle|f_k(x)\rangle = \sum_y (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (|x\rangle + |x'\rangle) \otimes |y\rangle \Rightarrow (\otimes_i |b_i\rangle) \otimes |+\theta\rangle \otimes |y\rangle$$



t_k, k



$$(\alpha_i \leftarrow \{0, \frac{\pi}{4}, \dots, \frac{7\pi}{4}\})_{i=1}^{n-1}$$

$k, (\alpha_i)$


Compute circuit

$y, (b_i)$

$$(x, x') := \text{Inv}(t_k, y)$$


$$\theta := (-1)^{x_n} \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} (x_i - x'_i)(b_i\pi + \alpha_i)$$

⇒ Gets θ



⇒ Produces $|+\theta\rangle$

Hardcore function and Honest-but-curious model



Cannot be better than random guess: θ **hard-core** function.

Security

Blindness of the output θ .

Corollary: QFactory is secure in the honest-but-curious model.

If adversary:

- follows the protocol
- can only access classical registers

\Rightarrow he cannot determine θ

Intuition of proof

θ is a hardcore function: proof based on Goldreich-Levin Theorem:

Theorem

If f is a one-way function, then the predicate

$hc(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{r}) = \sum x_i r_i \pmod 2$ cannot be distinguished from a random bit, given \mathbf{r} and $f(\mathbf{x})$.

Recall, in our case: $f(x) \approx y$ and

$$\theta \approx \sum \underbrace{(x_i - x'_i)}_{\text{Unknown to server}} \underbrace{(4b_i + \alpha_i)}_{\text{Known to server}} \pmod 8$$

Summary and future work

Summary


- QFactory: simulate quantum channel from classical channel
- ~~quantum client~~ → classical clients
- For now, proof in honest-but-curious model



Future work


- Improve proof of security in Universal Composability model
- Improve efficiency in blind computing
- Explore new possible applications, certified qubits (QFactory + Zero Knowledge proof) that could improve MPC, GHZ state.

Applications of QFactory




Questions

Thank you for your attention!



arxiv.org/abs/1802.08759

Function construction



$$f_{A,y}((s, e), c) = Ax + e + c \times y$$

Comparison with other works

| Paper | Classical Homomorphic Encryption for Circuits | Homo-morphic Quantum | On the possibility of blind quantum computing | Classical Verification of Quantum Computations |
|-------------------------|---|----------------------|---|--|
| Blind input | Green | Green | Red | Blue |
| Blind algorithm | Blue | Green | Red | Blue |
| Verifiability | Red | Green | Blue | Green |
| Non-Interactive | Green | Green | Red | Red |
| Efficiency/Requirements | FHE | | UBQC/VBQC, Linear | Post-hoc, poly degree 9? |